Chief Procurement Officer: From Silos to Synergy

The Office of the Procurement Ombud

The Office of the Procurement Ombud (OPO) is a neutral and independent organization of the Government of Canada that works collaboratively with federal departments and Canadian businesses (suppliers) to promote fairness, openness, and transparency in federal procurement. OPO delivers on this mandate by connecting stakeholders, investigating complaints, resolving problems, reviewing procurement practices and making recommendations, and sharing best practices.

In 2018, OPO launched a knowledge deepening and sharing (KDS) initiative to better understand key issues in federal procurement. This Chief Procurement Officer: From Silos to Synergy study is the 10th study conducted under the KDS initiative, all of which are published on Office of the Procurement Ombud’s website. Through the publication of KDS studies, OPO intends to share knowledge and provide helpful guidance for federal procurement stakeholders.

Acknowledgements

OPO would like to thank the participating federal organizations and interviewees for their input in developing this study.

Enquiries

Enquiries should be directed to:
Office of the Procurement Ombud
410 Laurier Ave. W., Suite 400
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 1B7
Canada
Telephone:
1‑866‑734‑5169
Toll-free for hearing-impaired:
1‑800‑926‑9105

Email:
ombudsman@opo-boa.gc.ca

On this page

Introduction

Interest in the concept of a Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) is not new. In 2021, the Office of the Procurement Ombud (OPO) published a knowledge deepening and sharing study that looked at the procurement issues that the role could address. For that study, OPO reviewed persistent and on-going issues that have plagued federal procurement, noting that many of the issues were decades old. For the first study, OPO also looked to CPO models in Canadian provincial and international jurisdictions to understand what procurement issues these roles address.

The study pointed to four themes associated with the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO): agent of change, a single voice for procurement, coordination, and professionalization. In the years since the first study was published, there has been continued interest in the CPO model though it still does not exist at the federal level. OPO has presented on the topic at outreach events for the procurement community, and it continues to inform meetings with senior federal procurement officials.

Building on the first CPO study, this second study, Chief Procurement Officer: From Silos to Synergy, examines current procurement policy gaps and assesses the ability of CPO models to address them. The study is divided into four main sections:

  1. The federal procurement environment
  2. Gaps in the present procurement system
  3. The role of a CPO in filling the gaps
  4. Potential models of a CPO

As part of this study OPO conducted interviews with senior procurement leaders within federal departments and agencies of varying sizes. Many interviewees were senior designated officials (SDOs), a role that was created under the policy on the Planning and Management of Investments, which took effect on May 13, 2021.

The Federal Procurement Environment

Federal procurement is a balance between decentralization and centralization. The current system features a decentralized network of departments and agencies that, with support from their own SDO, are charged with implementing government-wide policy. Leadership that binds the procurement community together is more centralized and comes from a few key institutions: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), Office of the Comptroller General (OCG), and Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), each of which is discussed in this study.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat

TBS is a strategic central agency, setting the direction and priorities for several areas of government, including procurement. TBS is a reflection of the role assigned to Treasury Board.footnote 1 TBS has three broad areas of responsibility: expenditure allocations to departments and programs; human resources (e.g., collective bargaining, job classification, bilingualism); and improving administrative efficiencyfootnote 2.

One must distinguish between Treasury Board and TBS. Both organizations support Cabinet by tracking internal expenditures and personnel management.footnote 3 However, the former is a Cabinet committee, led by the president of the Treasury Board, a Cabinet member.footnote 3 The latter is a federal department that functions as the administrative arm of the Cabinet committee (Treasury Board). The secretary of the Treasury Board is the deputy head of TBSfootnote 4 and is appointed by the Governor in Council.footnote 1

TBS is referred to as a central agency, and it serves a critical role in the structure of the federal government, providing the political leaders with information about the functions of government.footnote 5 Entities designated as central agencies are “central” because they operate above departments and agencies and support cooperation, coherence, and policy development.footnote 6 Paul Thomas, a scholar on the topic, summarizes the job of central agencies as being “to make a mesh of things, that is, to ensure that a central framework of policy and administrative values guides the multitudinous and diverse range of activities undertaken by governments.”footnote 7

Office of the Comptroller General

The OCG is an office within TBS, sharing responsibility with the secretary of the Treasury Board for supporting the president and other members of the Treasury Board.footnote 8 It “recommends policies and sets out directives and guidelines for financial and administrative management and supports the performance evaluation responsibility of the Board.”footnote 7

The authorities of the OCG flow from the Financial Administration Act.footnote 9 Under the policy on the Planning and Management of Investments, section 4.3 places the responsibility for providing government-wide leadership and support for professional development, along with guidance and recommending corrective action relating to each of the directives under the policy, into the hands of the OCG.footnote 10

For procurement, the OCG is the policy lead, creating the umbrella framework and direction under which departments must work.footnote 11 The present administrative policy is governed by the Directive on the Management of Procurement (DMP), which is non-prescriptive and principles based in comparison to its more detailed predecessor, the former Treasury Board Contracting Policy.footnote 10 Departments and agencies subject to the DMP are now responsible to create their own procurement management frameworks consisting of processes, systems and controls that include oversight, planning, and reporting. The DMP further provides delegations of authority for departmental procurements.footnote 10

Public Services and Procurement Canada

The Department of Public Works and Government Services Act (the Act) sets out rules and requirements for how the government can acquire goods and services.footnote 12 The Act establishes that PSPC is a common service organization providing departments, boards, and agencies of the federal government with services in support of its programs. As a common service provider for the Government of Canada, PSPC “supports federal departments and agencies in their daily operations as their central purchasing agent, real property manager, treasurer, accountant, pay and pension administrator, integrity advisor, common service provider and linguistic authority.”footnote 13

Canada’s current federal procurement system leans more toward decentralization, with a vast number of procurements done in departments and agencies.footnote 10 However, two important factors establish PSPC’s relationship with other departments and agencies. First, is the delegation of authority. PSPC’s enabling legislation gives its Minister the authority for the procurement of goods, who may then sub-delegate a limited amount of authority to the Ministers of other departments.footnote 10 Within this limit, departments can procure goods without PSPC’s involvement. Over this amount, PSPC must act as the contracting authority on behalf of departments in procuring goods.footnote 14 For acquiring services, departments have separate authorities delegated by Treasury Board.

The second factor in PSPC’s relationship with departments and agencies is the creation of standing offers and supply arrangements for procuring common goods and services.footnote 10 For regularly used goods and services—be it pencils, paper, office chairs, or consulting services—PSPC is able to create tools intended to make the procurement process more efficient. These tools are intended to make meeting recurring needs much easier than if an individualized procurement process were launched each time the need arose.

In addition, due to its common service provider role, other departments and agencies regularly turn to PSPC for policy advice and guidance.footnote 10 In order to implement government-wide procurement policy established by TBS and the OCG, PSPC develops internal departmental policy guidance and practices that inform its own work. Other departments often use PSPC’s internal guidance documents as their own, choosing to adopt and adapt them.footnote 10 Two PSPC sources extensively used are the Supply Manual, a compendium of best practices, and the Standard Acquisition Clauses and Conditions (SACC) Manual that sets out standard procurement clauses and contractual provisions.footnote 10

In some cases, PSPC’s internal policy or guidance informs the government-wide policy.footnote 10 Once implemented within PSPC—and if proven successful—TBS may identify aspects or whole policies for government-wide use.footnote 10 For example, PSPC developed and implemented a code of conduct for procurement.footnote 15 After proving successful within PSPC, the OCG made the code of conduct for procurement a government-wide policy.footnote 16

Certain departments and agencies beyond TBS, OCG and PSPC have specific responsibilities that are government-wide in nature. For example, Innovation, Science, and Economic Development (ISED) manages the Policy on Title to Intellectual Property Arising Under Crown Procurement Contracts. ISED is also responsible for the Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy. Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) administers the requirement for federal departments and agencies to award a minimum 5% of the total value of contracts to Indigenous businesses.footnote 17 Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) administers the federal contractors program, while Global Affairs Canada leads trade agreement negotiations.

Federal Departments and Senior Designated Officials

Federal departments and agencies implement central procurement policy and directives from TBS and OCG within their respective departments and agencies. The deputy ministers (DM) under the Financial Administration Act are designated as the accounting officer, meaning that the DM “is accountable before the appropriate committees of the Senate and the House of Commons” for the prudent management of government resources, while complying with Treasury Board directives.footnote 18

The appointment of the departmental SDO is required under section 4.1.1 of the Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments (the Policy), and the DMP is a directive made under it, describing the responsibilities of the SDO.footnote 19 The main responsibilities of the SDO include the creation and implementation of a procurement management framework, monitoring implementation of the DMP in the department, and supporting the DM’s accountability for requirements under the overarching Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments.footnote 20 Procurement management frameworks are a critical part of the DMP and the intention is to have SDOs create frameworks that are aligned with their internal controls and commensurate to the risk tolerance levels of the department.footnote 10

The roles and responsibilities of the SDO mix with the delegated person’s substantive role, meaning there is no singular SDO job classification.footnote 21 In practice this means that one has both a substantive role and an SDO role. SDOs are typically senior executives in a department who are at the assistant deputy minister (ADM) or director general (DG) level. In some cases the role is placed with the ADM, and then the responsibilities of the role are further delegated to a DG, senior director, director or manager typically responsible for procurement.footnote 10,footnote 22

Gaps In the Present Procurement System

Notable gaps in the present procurement system include the following: lack of clarity regarding the responsibility for creating vs. implementing procurement policy; lack of capacity-building systems that can support professionalization of the procurement function; and lack of a government-wide vendor performance management (VPM) system.

Creator vs. Implementor of Policy: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat/Office of the Comptroller General and Public Services and Procurement Canada

There is a blurring of roles in the present procurement environment regarding responsibility for creating and implementing procurement policy.

Currently, Treasury Board delegates much of its power to create procurement policy to the OCG. Under section 4.3 of the Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments (the Policy), Treasury Board assigns the OCG responsibility for providing “government-wide leadership and supporting the professional development” of the communities under the Policy.footnote 23 Subsection 4.3.2 assigns the OCG a further advisory role by giving it the responsibility to “provide guidance and recommend corrective action” regarding the implementation of the Policy’s instruments, including the DMP.footnote 21 Finally, under section 2.3 of the Policy, Treasury Board delegates the authority to “issue, amend and rescind” appendices of directives like the DMP to the OCG.footnote 24 This lets the OCG set out mandatory procedures and requirements related to each department’s responsibilities under the DMP.

The Department of Public Works and Government Services Act is the enabling legislation for PSPC, giving the Minister broad jurisdiction over the acquisition of goods and services. Further, under the Act, PSPC has a mandate to “investigate and develop services for increasing the efficiency and economy of the federal public administration and for enhancing integrity and efficiency in the contracting process.”footnote 25

While PSPC has historically made its internal guidance and best practices available to other government departments and agencies to adopt and adapt to their specific needs, this is not a requirement within the Act. PSPC is not responsible for government-wide policy, but rather creates and implements internal policy guidance for its own use. Further, PSPC was never intended to support the particulars of policy implementation.footnote 10 However, the issue is that as practice lead, PSPC internal policies are often imported by other departments.footnote 10 Even if this role were supported by PSPC’s enabling legislation, the current framework doesn’t require other departments to adopt PSPC policy, and some do and some don’t, as the DMP allows these departments to implement the DMP’s principles as they deem appropriate.footnote 10

Government officials interviewed for this study commented on this point. One interviewee noted that there is not a perfect harmony between PSPC and the OCG/TBS.footnote 10 A second interviewee emphasized the difficulty in assigning responsibility,footnote 10 as PSPC is the expert on its own internal policy, but should not be asked to give advice about government-wide policies written by the OCG/TBS, or how those policies should be used in other departments of varying sizes and mandates.footnote 10 Another told OPO that this puts other departments in a bind, saying that there’s nowhere to turn when PSPC doesn’t provide policy advice.footnote 10 The difficulty is that no singular role has responsibility for federal procurement at the highest level; within departments this role is either at the ADM level or below, and only has authority for a singular department.

Departments may choose to adopt and adapt PSPC policy and practices, or not. One consequence of the less prescriptive and more principles-based DMP is that some departments turned more toward PSPC’s procurement tools.footnote 10 For example, historically PSPC’s Supply Manual was a well-used document by many departments.footnote 10 But it was never a policy per se, but rather a compendium of best practices.footnote 10 A consequence of this is that departments refer to it “authoritatively,” giving it a status it was not intended to have.footnote 10

Another common theme heard in researching this study is that TBS/OCG are not providing enough support to policy implementors across federal departments. When interviewees were asked about the DMP, it was common to hear that there was insufficient support in implementing it,footnote 10 with one interviewee noting that “It is just dumped [on us] and then we have to figure it out with PSPC.”footnote 10 One went further, identifying the issue as being a long standing problem, saying “Let’s be realistic, the support from the center historically—even with the previous policies—was lackluster.”footnote 10 One limitation on TBS/OCG’s ability to provide support to policy implementors is financial. TBS/OCG require more resources, both human and financial, to be able to more effectively serve its stakeholders at this critical time.

Smaller departments carry a different burden when implementing a procurement policy or directive, not only because policies can operationalize differently, but because capacity and resource limitations can negatively impact implementation.footnote 10 Smaller departments often turn to PSPC for guidance,footnote 10 but, as noted above, PSPC is not intended—by practice or by legislation—to be the “central” policy beacon, and departments often feel that this guidance is not forthcoming.

There is complexity surrounding delegated authorities to procure goods and services (including construction). There are several divisions of responsibility between departments, whereby they may either procure goods and services for themselves, using either PSPC (goods) or TBS (services) delegated authority, or they must use PSPC as a common service provider to procure the goods on their behalf.footnote 26 In cases where the contract value exceeds established contracting limits, including when PSPC is the contracting authority, Treasury Board approval is required. These contracting limits are set-out in the DMP. The various delegated authorities combined with mandatory and optional standardized tools create a complex web without a true government-wide authority with accountability.

To summarize, at the moment, there is a blurring of roles regarding the creation and implementation of procurement policy, and a disconnect between legislation and expectations with respect to the provision of guidance.

Capacity Building and Professionalization

Capacity building and professionalization are two factors that help an institution achieve its goals and mandated activities, while also helping individuals become part of a recognized community of experts. For procurement, it is about creating a serious career path that is recognized as an area of expertise. In speaking about capacity building, some SDOs noted that there has been limited progress, with most programs already in place prior to the SDO being created.footnote 10

There are multiple issues with procurement capacity building, not just within departments, but across the government. First, these initiatives are generally hindered by a lack of funding.footnote 10 In addition, capacity building is different between small and large departments.footnote 10 With limited resources and finite opportunities, small departments often have to focus resources to meet mandated program activities and don’t have support and training for procurement.footnote 10 Another issue is high turnover among procurement resources.footnote 10 Individuals frequently turn to larger procuring departments for developmental opportunities that are not available in the smaller departments.footnote 10 Lastly, recruitment and succession planning has become a government-wide issue in procurement, with several departments adopting multi-year procurement development programs to address this concern.

Lack of professionalization of the procurement function has been a long standing problem.footnote 27 As recently as 2019, a TBS evaluation highlighted that the procurement community was in need of professionalization.footnote 28 Equally, one interviewee made the point that procurement isn’t being viewed as a serious function.footnote 10

There have been previous attempts to professionalize the procurement community. TBS had a certification program for procurement and materiel management, and although it met with mixed results, it was a step in the right direction.footnote 28 That said, the program suffered from low completion rates. Between 2006-2018, the program was open to some 4,000 procurement and materiel specialists, however, there were only 108 graduates of the program.footnote 28 More significantly, of the 108 total graduates, there were only three graduates of the second level.footnote 28 The low success rate could be, in part, attributed to a lack of investment, lack of available courses, need for a strong vision, and poor program administration, such as response times to enrollees.footnote 28 The program ended in early 2023.footnote 10

In June 2024, TBS presented a new professional development framework for the Government of Canada procurement and materiel management communities. Under this new framework, TBS is moving away from the previous certification approach to one that focusses on four core areas: (1) roles and responsibilities, (2) continuous learning, (3) career paths, and (4) performance recognition. TBS has stated the new framework will feature, as an example, updated procurement competencies, a new career path prototype for procurement and material management, and a reduction of barriers for professional development with updated core, supplemental, and specialized learning supported by mentoring. Additionally there will be improved web presence support that will be more inclusive, streamlined, with a space for networking and user interaction.footnote 29

Notwithstanding changes that may come with the implementation of the new TBS professional development framework, capacity building in the procurement community is also siloed with individual departments creating their own developmental programs to compliment basic training. For example, PSPC has its own “Intern Officer Development Program (IODP),” which aims at recruitment and in-depth capacity building.footnote 30 Though the program is well regarded, a limitation is that it is not accessible to everyone as the acceptance process is rigorous and only open to some, given the limited number of spaces available. One interviewee noted that the program could benefit from strategic re-thinking and investment.footnote 10 There are other development programs akin to the IODP, including the Supply Chain Management Apprenticeship Program by the Canada Revenue Agency, and the Materiel Acquisition and Support Officer Development Program by the Department of National Defense.footnote 31

Vendor Performance Management

Vendor performance management is “the monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on a vendor’s performance against the requirements of a particular contract.”footnote 32 VPM can effectively serve as both an incentive for good performance, and a disincentive for poor performance, by taking vendors’ rating scores, good and bad, in to account in the award of future contracts.

The federal government does not have a government-wide VPM program. The Minister of Public Services and Procurement was required in their 2017 and 2019 mandate letters to “continue the development of better vendor management tools to ensure the Government is able to hold contractors accountable for poor performance or unacceptable behavior, particularly in large-scale procurements.”footnote 33 This action item was not included in the most recent mandate letter from 2021.footnote 34

Despite VPM not being included in the Minister’s most recent mandate letter, within PSPC there is an on-going VPM initiative and pilot project underway.footnote 35 The end goal is to test the program within PSPC, and then, if successful, have TBS apply the policy government-wide.footnote 36 If it were applied government-wide, there would need to be a clear point of accountability responsible for administering the policy and ensuring that government departments and agencies are following a consistent approach, so that a vendor’s poor or excellent performance for one department can be taken in to account regarding the award of future contracts for itself and other departments.

A VPM policy within PSPC is not the same as a government-wide VPM program, and is a continuation of the siloed approach to procurement. PSPC covers a wide-range of procurements, but a large number of purchases are made by departments without PSPC’s involvement. Departments plagued by poor performing suppliers have inadequate means to hold them to account, and are often forced to award contracts to suppliers known to under-deliver because the latter have submitted the lowest priced compliant bid.

There is a wrinkle for cases where the procurement is not by and for PSPC. When PSPC is the contracting authority, and the business owner (i.e., recipient of the good or service) is another government department, there is no means for requiring the business owner to track vendor performance for the purposes of complying with a PSPC policy. Since other departments are not subject to PSPC policy, this leaves government-wide adherence patchy at best. The result is that poor performers noted by PSPC can (and do) continue to obtain federal contracts from other departments without impediment. A lack of cohesion and uniform implementation defeats the purpose of a VPM program, and there needs to be a single authority responsible for it across government.

Without a government-wide VPM program, solicitations will continue to be jeopardized. When departments are not able to penalize or prohibit poor performers from obtaining contracts, it leaves departments looking for ways to avoid working with certain suppliers, including activities that threaten the fairness, openness and transparency of the procurement process. The solicitation process, particularly the development of the technical criteria chosen for the evaluation of bids and award of contracts, is not the proper forum for this activity. One known issue is that a lack of VPM contributes to the use of restrictive criteria, a finding that OPO has noted in its systemic reviews of federal procurement practices.

The Role of a Chief Procurement Officer In Filling the Gaps

A CPO would create a singular point of focus and expertise for the creation, interpretation and consistent application of procurement policies within the federal government, while ensuring that those acquiring goods, services, and construction on behalf of departments have similar training and understanding of the principles involved and are able to apply the rules in a consistent manner across government. A single role is needed to provide leadership and to simplify procurement.

There is currently no clear, single source of procurement leadership in the federal government, as opposed to functions like human resources, finance and information management where a government-wide leader does exist.

There is a myriad of senior leadership roles in federal procurement—TBS, OCG, PSPC, Procurement Ombud—not to mention the significant procurement roles played by Department of National Defence and Shared Services Canada. Indeed, one counter argument to the idea of a CPO is precisely that the role is already being done—albeit by multiple people.footnote 10 But no single leader speaks, provides rules and guidance, or oversees capacity development for federal procurement. The current procurement system is marked by silos of responsibility and accountability that sometimes either overlap or leave gaps. One interviewee, a senior procurement official, made the point that everyone is doing their little piece but these pieces don’t really fit together all the time.footnote 10 Another shared the sentiment, stating we need a head of procurement; we need someone to turn to.footnote 10

Leadership can help simplify procurement. There are layers of trade agreements, legislation, regulations, policies, directives, guidance documents and procedures that must be followed, with new layers being added. The Procurement Ombud regularly hears from suppliers who struggle with the complexity of the process, and the topic is regularly discussed in OPO’s annual report. In fact, PSPC through Procurement Assistance Canada (formerly the Office of Small and Medium Enterprises) has an entire program with offices across Canada mandated to help prospective bidders navigate the complexities of obtaining a federal contract.

Government buyers are not exempt from these complexities. SDOs interviewed for this study told OPO that requirements are always changing, and represent “thousands and thousands of pages” that procuring officials have to be aware of.footnote 10 For departments, there are more and more considerations that have to be taken into account when conducting a procurement, including Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+), green procurement, Indigenous procurement, agile procurement, accessibility, and social procurement. Increasingly, procurements also go through public consultations, adding further complexity and time to the process.footnote 10

Procurement simplification is largely about consistency, standardizing and streamlining processes where possible, and reducing redundancy. A CPO could significantly help simplify the procurement process for both suppliers and buyers by integrating policy development, interpretation and implementation, along with overseeing a consistent training and development program that would professionalize the function.

Filling the Gap: Policy Creator and Implementor

As a central figure exclusively focussed on procurement, the CPO would sit atop the multi-departmental SDO framework and have a strong hand in supporting policy implementation including the DMP. When a federal VPM program is created, the CPO would also provide the required government-wide integration in the areas of policy, guidance, and management.

The CPO would further play an interpretive and advisory role to assist in developing practical policy and guidance within respective departments. As noted above, many departments are currently relying on PSPC to fill the gap for interpretation and advice on government-wide policy, a task that is not part of PSPC’s legislative mandate. A CPO could fill that role.

Combining strategic direction and practical guidance in one role would result in a more cohesive approach across government.footnote 10 Smaller departments share a different procurement context and burden, and need support and guidance from an experienced, adequately resourced central figure.footnote 10 Procurement officials in all departments, particularly those new to the field, need that central support and guidance which, in combination with government-wide training and development programs, would contribute greatly to the professionalization of the procurement function.

Filling the Gap for Capacity Building and Professionalization

A CPO could significantly help improve capacity building and professionalization within the procurement function. A centralized, coordinated approach in these two areas would create a more flexible procurement function, where practitioners clearly know and understand the rules and how to implement them through a common government-wide approach.

Training must not only address the knowledge and application of policy and procurement tools, but also progress toward reducing risk aversion and exercising judgement in a variety of contexts including emergency procurement, specialized commodities, socio-economic initiatives, and emerging technology.

The present siloed approach to capacity building and professionalization has not succeeded. The siloed approach, beyond carving up responsibilities for capacity building, does not offer an effective, sustainable, and robust answer to a whole-of-government approach to procurement. A CPO-led government-wide program for capacity building and professionalization of the function would make strides toward equipping procurement officials with the best resources to meet their department’s needs on a consistent basis. Department-specific training must compliment general training, and a government-wide training program coordinated and overseen by a CPO would ensure that all persons choosing to enter the field have the same basic knowledge and foundational skills to enable them to further specialize as their careers progress.

Filling the Gap for Vendor Performance Management

VPM is a crucial piece of a centralized approach to fair, open and transparent procurement. A CPO would lead a government-wide policy initiative, ensuring that departments and agencies have the tools and resources needed to both hold suppliers accountable for poor performance and reward them for good performance.

A CPO-led VPM program could ensure that the criteria for assessing supplier performance are applied consistently by federal departments and agencies across Canada, and that suppliers’ rating scores are accessible to all federal departments to be taken in to account (both positively and negatively) in the award of future contracts. Government-wide oversight and implementation of VPM would support sound stewardship of taxpayer dollars and further strengthen the integrity of the procurement process, as the sharing of supplier performance ratings across departments would help alleviate potential pressure on procurement officials to find other ways to avoid having to award contracts to poorly performing suppliers, e.g., the use of restrictive criteria or unsound bid evaluation practices.

VPM is a much needed government-wide program, however its adoption within the current framework at the federal level would lead to serious challenges. As noted above, there is a blurring of responsibilities between PSPC, TBS/OCG, and line departments with respect to the creation and implementation of procurement policy. If a VPM program was adopted in the current environment, implementation challenges would likely include inconsistent vendor performance evaluation methods and challenges sharing information across departments, as well as uneven application of the weight accorded to past vendor performance in the award of future contracts. For a VPM program to be successful, metrics must be applied consistently and evenly to commodity groups across departments. Program implementors (i.e., both business owners and contracting authorities) must know to whom they can turn for clear guidance on both the interpretation and application of the rules. A CPO would be well-positioned to play this central coordination and leadership role with respect to VPM.

Potential Models of a Chief Procurement Officer

There are multiple potential CPO models, and one size does not fit all. What works in some provinces and international jurisdictions may not work in Canada at the federal level. However, the general idea can be molded to meet Canada’s federal procurement architecture, aiming to address known issues and gaps in procurement. This section looks at three potential models for a federal CPO, contemplating what its implementation could look like.

Some senior leaders interviewed were warm to the idea of a CPO, or welcomed further research.footnote 10 Some did not like it, were neutral, or thought it was too simplistic.footnote 10 Others argued that the role is already covered by senior leaders in TBS, OCG, PSPC, and the Procurement Ombud,footnote 10 and that since these roles already exist, the known and longstanding procurement issues are a result of limited funding for the existing roles.footnote 10 There has certainly been a limitation for funding in some or all of the above-noted areas, and through interviews it was made clear that this has certainly hindered both the OCG and the Procurement Ombud in their roles.footnote 10 If the creation of a CPO as contemplated in this report is not desired, one means of addressing some of the procurement gaps and issues noted would be to provide increased funding for the OCG’s procurement responsibilities. This could enhance support to policy makers and implementors, while also providing resources for community development and professionalization of the procurement function.

OPO considered three potential CPO models:

  1. A CPO in TBS
  2. A CPO in PSPC
  3. A new department, headed by the CPO

When asked about potential models, respondents gave various answers. For some, a CPO in TBS was a natural fit, as it would be able to maintain the pan-governmental view provided by TBS’ central agency role.footnote 10 TBS is that central line of oversight, and each department is accountable to the central agency.footnote 10 For others, this was not welcomed, as the CPO may get lost in the mix of senior leaders already in TBS and the OCG,footnote 10 and noted that there are already too many deputies in TBS.footnote 10 Highlighting the benefits of neutrality, one went further and said the role has to be completely independent of TBS.footnote 10

For some, a CPO in TBS would mean something different than if it were in PSPC. They suggested that in TBS, the role would be about good policy development and implementation, ensuring that there is a benefit to Canada, whereas if the role is about the practicalities of procurement, like questions of execution and methods of supply, as well as hands-on procurement training, then it would be better placed in PSPC.footnote 10

The third CPO model is the most transformational, requiring the creation of a new federal department led by a CPO. This model would take certain responsibilities from both TBS and PSPC and consolidate them under a new department. One interviewee noted that the issue is really about financial efficiency, and this is potentially where cost savings lie.footnote 10 By creating a new department, it is a signal of the seriousness of the role, and in itself a step toward professionalization of the procurement function. Further, it would be an opportunity to propose new solutions to fill the procurement gaps, with a clean slate moving away from preconceived ideas rooted in longstanding and inefficient practices. This enhanced seriousness and importance accorded to federal procurement would support professionalization and standardization across departments, and allow Canada to demonstrate excellence in procurement, supporting socio-economic initiatives, best value, and integrity on the world stage.

A Chief Procurement Officer Classification Level

The classification level of the CPO matters, as the position will require decision making authority and a seat at the Deputy Heads’ table.

One current criticism of the current SDO model is that SDOs’ classification levels vary across departments (e.g., as high as ADM level in some, down to manager level in others), and that they do not all have the weight required to ensure that procurement issues are given appropriate attention. Consideration should be given to creating a CPO at the deputy minister (DM) level, as DMs are department heads filling the role of “accounting officer”, ensuring departmental compliance with mandated authorities, and assisting and advising the Minister.footnote 37 DMs regularly meet with and advise their Minister on the workings of the department,footnote 38 translating direction and priorities from the Minister into actionable policy-making.footnote 39 DMs also have access to other DMs across government, so that when urgent or important developments take place in the area of procurement, they can ensure that their colleague DMs are aware of what must be done and why. The DM role also creates linkages back to the political structure, ensuring that procurement is taken seriously and is much more responsive to the needs of Canadians.

Recommendation

The Procurement Ombud recommends that the Government of Canada consider creating a CPO position with appropriate authority to carry out responsibilities covering policy creation, interpretation, and application, providing expertise in all areas of federal procurement including capacity building and professionalization, and a federal VPM regime.

Date modified: